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The Battling Begums - Building Trust in Bangladesh 
 
Introduction 
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, became an 
independent state after the civil war of 1971 and joined the Commonwealth in 
1972. It is a densely populated South Asian country with some 142 million people 
who commonly experience natural disasters in the form of floods and cyclones in 
the flat land and delta of rivers on the Bay of Bengal. Poverty is widespread with 
GDP per head estimated at just $444 in 2007, or almost half the population living 
on less than one dollar per day (Oxford Economics, 2008). Since independence, 
Bangladesh has experienced political turbulence and spent 15 years under 
military rule until democracy was restored in 1991. Continuing unrest and 
violence have been a major impediment to economic growth set alongside the 
increasing strength of Islamic fundamentalism.  
Politics have been dominated and polarised by the two largest political parties, 
long-time rivals the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
(BNP). The October 2001 elections produced a BNP victory in the form of a 4-
party alliance. The opposition party, Awami League, refused to accept the result 
and from 2001-2006 their attendance at parliament was sporadic, claiming 
discrimination by the BNP speaker. Violence and political strikes/hartals have 
accompanied the political turmoil. In August 2004, twenty people were killed and 
more than 100 injured in a grenade attack at an Awami League political rally. In 
January 2005 the former finance minister, Shah Kibria, was assassinated along 
with four colleagues and over 70 injured in an attack at an AL rally in Northern 
Bangladesh. Since summer 2006 opposition parties, directed by Awami League, 
claimed that the BNP-led government was seeking to manipulate the electoral 
infrastructure and announced in January 2007 a boycott of the general election. 
The parliamentary elections were cancelled. On 11th January 2007, the President 
declared a state of emergency and a reconstituted unelected military-backed 
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caretaker government was put in place. Under the constitution, executive power 
rests with the caretaker government until a prime minister heading a new 
administration is sworn in following a parliamentary election. Foreign 
governments were keen to see emergency rule lifted and the restoration of full 
constitutional rights amidst reports of human rights abuses and mass arrests. 
Parliamentary elections were held on 29th December 2008 to a new civilian 
government after two years of emergency rule. 
One of the most fundmental obstacles to building trust in Bangladesh is the 
pervasiveness of corruption at many levels: parliament, elections, and the 
delivery of core public services. People feel powerless to address the excesses 
of corruption and have lost faith in the democratic system. The role of the 
caretaker government was to tackle polarization and patronage and, in so doing, 
to establish trust in the democratic process. This paper considers the ‘success’ of 
building and maintaining trust in Bangladesh’s parliamentary democracy.  
Conceptualising trust in Bangladesh 
Trust is an ambiguous and multi-faceted concept. Bovens and Wille (2008) argue 
that trust can be considered a litmus test of how well government is perceived in 
the eyes of citizens. Low trust ‘is usually understood as an indication that some 
elements of the political system – politicians, institutions, or both – are 
functioning poorly; or that the expectation of citizens are too high’ (Bovens and 
Wille, 2008: 284). Other writers see this combination as problematic in 
operationalising the concept of trust. Catterberg and Moreno (2005) claim it is 
difficult to differentiate between trust in political institutions and government, and 
the evaluation of government performance. Their empirical work on measuring 
trust in new and established democracies focused on political institutions, rather 
than government performance, on the basis that confidence in the institutions 
reflected people’s evaluation of the political environment. This contrasts with 
research conducted by Kim (2005: 615) who argued that ‘confidence in 
government performance, along with credible commitment and fairness in 
procedure, is an important variable for attaining the trustworthiness of 
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government.’ For the purposes of this paper, we adopt a classification developed 
by Nye (1997) who attributed economic, social-cultural, or political factors as 
causally linked to changes in trust in government. The detail of these factors are 
summarised by Chanley et al (2000). First, trust in government is influenced by 
the performance of the national economy and citizens’ evaluations of the 
economy. Negative perceptions of the economy promote greater distrust in 
government. Second, declining trust has been attributed to social-cultural factors 
such as rising crime and child poverty. Finally, changes in trust in government 
have been linked to numerous political factors, including citizens’ evaluations of 
incumbents and institutions, an increasing number of political scandals, ever 
more media focus on political corruption and scandal, and the end of the Cold 
War. We return to this classification as a way of trying to understand the causes 
of declining trust in Bangladesh.  
There are two key ways of conceptualizing trust in Bangladesh - at the macro 
and micro levels. At the macro level one useful model is the National Integrity 
System developed by Transparency International (see figure 1). The National 
Integrity System is like a Greek Temple, the foundations of which are an active 
and engaged Bangladesh citizenry who can participate in free and fair elections 
and hold government to account (voice and accountability) by exhibiting core 
values such as democracy, justice and freedom of expression. The roof of the 
temple is the nation’s integrity system buttressed by a series of mutually 
reinforcing pillars whose strength determines whether Bangladesh will have key 
societal outcomes: sustainable development, quality of life, and the rule of law. If 
some of the pillars are weak then the national integrity system will suffer, 
although trade-offs are possible – restricted media freedom might be 
compensated by an efficient civil service or strong civil society. Alamgir et al 
(2006) describe the model as the sum total of the institutions and practices within 
Bangladesh that address aspects of maintaining honesty and integrity of 
government and building trust amongst its citizens. They argue that while the 
pillars are interdependent, each contributing to the strength of the other, the role 
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of an effective parliament is a sine qua non for the national integrity system to 
function properly and to gain the trust of the population of Bangladesh. 
 
Yet in a study of national integrity systems in South Asia, Aminuzzaman (2006: 
6) concluded: 
 In Bangladesh, confrontational politics, a poor parliamentary culture and 
the dominant and sometimes intolerant attitude of the party in power tend 
to mar the spirit and modality of its operational business - which in many 
cases has resulted in continuous boycotting and abstinence by the major 
opposition party.  
 
Iftekharuzzaman (2007) described the roles of the parliament of Bangladesh 
(Jatiya Sangsad) in a representative democracy as: a forum for debate on behalf 
Figure 1
Conceptualising trust in Bangladesh
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of citizens on matters of public interest; a law making body; and, an institution for 
ensuring accountability of the government by oversight through properly 
functioning committees. On all three counts he argued, ‘parliament within 15 
years of its restoration managed to badly damage its credibility and public trust’ 
(Iftekharuzzaman, 2007:1). 
 
At the micro level one of the more obvious manifestations of trust between 
citizen and the state is their direct experiences of public services delivery. The 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (2004: article 15) states:  
 It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the State to attain, through 
planned economic growth, a constant increase of productive forces and a 
steady improvement in the material and cultural standard of living of the 
people, with a view to securing for its citizens the provision of the basic 
necessities of life, including food, clothing, shelter, education and medical 
care.  
 
We can capture people’s direct experiences of the public provision of health and 
education services and the state’s betrayal of trust from data gathered through 
the 2007 National Household Survey (a 5,000 household interview probability 
survey selected across 52 districts (out of 64) within Bangladesh). Data from the 
survey revealed that 72.6% of respondents (n = 3,629) had used education 
services in the previous 12 months (Transparency International Bangladesh, 
2008). This level of service usage represented the highest interaction between 
citizen and the public sector examined in the survey which also included: 
electricity, health, NGOs, banking, tax, land administration, local government, law 
enforcement, and the judiciary. In terms of the experiences of education service 
users, 34.7% of them (n = 1260) had encountered corruption in education under 
various guises: bribery, negligence of duties, nepotism, embezzlement, or 
deception. The breakdown of these figures is shown in figure 2. The largest form 
of corruption in the experience of users was negligence of duties by teachers 
involving such things as: poor time keeping; irregular classes (absenteeism), 
delays in releasing exam results, and lack of interest and motivation by teachers 
in their jobs. 
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Figure 2: Corruption in Education (n = 1260)
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The survey data also showed that 44.7% of respondents (n = 2,234) had used 
health services in the previous 12 months. In terms of their experiences as 
service users, 41.8% of them (n = 934) had encountered corruption in health 
under various guises: bribery, negligence of duties, nepotism, embezzlement, or 
deception. The breakdown of these figures is shown in figure 3 where bribery 
and negligence are the highest forms of corruption experienced by health service 
users. These will take the form of: doctors charging for writing prescriptions, 
referring patients to their private clinics, and having to pay extra fees for 
pathological tests in government health facilities. 
 
How is trust measured? 
If trust is conceived in Bangladesh as a strong national integrity system and 
tackling corruption, how is it measured? Because trust is an amorphous concept, 
there are two possible surrogate indicators – Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(World Bank) and the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International). 
 
Worldwide Governance Indicators measure six broad constituents of what has 
been defined in its broadest sense as ‘governance’, viz: voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann et al, 2008). The most 
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relevant indicator when considering trust in government is ‘voice and 
accountability’. This indicator measures the extent to which a country's citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government - free and fair elections, trust 
in parliament, satisfaction with democracy, as well as freedom of expression & 
association, and a free media. Figure 4 shows the percentile rank of Bangladesh, 
compared with other South Asian countries, measured on the variable ‘voice and 
accountability’. Percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries worldwide 
that rate below these countries. Higher values indicate better governance 
arrangements. In the case of Bangladesh therefore, 28.8% of countries rate 
worse on ‘voice and accountability’ in 2007. Figure 5 shows the declining levels 
of trust in Bangladesh from 41.8% to 28.8% over the period 1998 – 2007. 
 
Figure 4: Trust in South Asian Countries
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Figure 5: Bangladesh: declining trust over 
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Given the potential for corruption in Bangladesh to destroy trust in government, 
the annual Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a 
surrogate indicator of whether there is a perceived improvement or deterioration 
in trust. The CPI ranks countries on a scale of 0 - 10 (1 = highly corrupt; 10 = 
highly clean). In the most recent results (2008), Bangladesh scored 2.1 and 
ranked 10th from the bottom among 180 countries (Transparency International, 
2008). During the period 2001 – 2005, Bangladesh was bottom of the list for five 
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successive years. It has improved its score from 2.0 to 2.1. There has been 
criticism of the validity of the index (Sik, 2002) not least because it is measuring 
perceived rather than actual corruption, but when set alongside the National 
Household Survey (discussed above) both indicate that ‘pervasive corruption 
remains unabated in Bangladesh’ (Transparency International Bangladesh, 2008: 
viii). 
Building trust – macro level 
It is clear from the discussions so far that there is a significant trust deficit in 
Bangladesh due largely to political instability, lack of confidence in the 
democratic process and the pervasiveness of corruption. It is ironic that a military 
backed caretaker regime which seized power in January 2007 saw its main task 
as building trust in the democratic process to prepare for parliamentary elections. 
A state of emergency was declared and citizens’ constitutional rights suspended. 
The caretaker government believed they could deliver better government than 
the notoriously corrupt Bangladesh politicians. There were allegations from 
Awami League that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party had compiled a list of up to 
14 million fake names and was planning massive electoral fraud in the 2007 
elections. The caretaker government launched a major anti-corruption drive by 
detaining more than 200 politicians and business leaders. By the end of 2007 the 
Ministry of Home Affairs had arrested almost ½ million people. The two former 
prime ministers (Sheik Hasina Wajed and Khaleda Zia) were jailed on corruption 
charges. The caretaker government also worked hard to establish trust through 
major institutional reforms of the country’s national integrity system. The Election 
Commission was reconstituted following allegations of partisanship and electoral 
laws amended to tackle fraud. The Public Service Commission, the appointments 
body for civil servants, was reformed to include procedures which make the 
entrance examination system more transparent and credible with the right of 
appeal. The inept Bureau of Anti-Corruption was abolished and replaced with an 
independent Anti-Corruption Commission. In a historic move, the Judiciary was 
separated from the Executive demonstrating the importance of a strong and 
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independent judiciary to ensure fair and transparent trials for all. As the tenure of 
the caretaker government lengthened however, foreign governments and donors 
which had supported the army’s intervention became increasingly worried about 
the rising number of human rights abuses, the slow pace of electoral reform, and 
called for lifting the state or emergency and early elections. 
Both political leaders were granted bail (along with many other high-profile 
politicians), released from prison and have yet to be prosecuted. The caretaker 
government had hoped for a conviction which would debar them from being 
elected but the two main parties had threatened to boycott the elections unless 
their leaders were released from prison. The court cases against the two former 
prime ministers were, in effect, put on hold until after the election. There have 
been suggestions that they were freed in apparent deals with the caretaker 
government, under which their parties would participate in general elections. In 
December 2008, ahead of the parliamentary elections, the President of 
Bangladesh (Iajddin Ahmed) lifted curbs on political and civil rights and press 
freedom ending the state of emergency which had lasted for almost 2 years. The 
interim government failed in its attempt to create an alternative to the two main 
political parties and sideline the two ‘battling begums’ (Muslim women of high 
rank: Sheikh Hasina and Zia) whose political tenure had been characterized by 
rampant corruption and entrenched politics. The Anti-Corruption Commission has 
had little success with it concentration on high profile cases due to a mix of poor 
legal work and inadequate training amongst its investigators. Legal procedures 
were breached during investigations and cases were rejected by the courts. The 
Commission has also been unable to tackle the systemic patronage which affects 
the daily lives of most Bangladeshis. The caretaker government raised 
expectations in its anti-corruption drive but ordinary citizens are now extremely 
frustrated by its failure. Despite the institutional reform programme of the 
caretaker government, the political scene will continue to be dominated by the 
two main feuding political parties and their respective leaders whose rotation in 
power for 15 years since 1991 and mutual hatred has played a significant part in 
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turning politics into a prolonged cycle of violent retaliation. The military’s vision of 
a reformed state remains unfulfilled. 
 
Building trust – micro level 
If building trust at the macro level has been unsuccessful, there is evidence of 
effective micro level activities. Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) has 
worked throughout the country as a social movement at the grassroots level to 
build trust amongst public service users. They do these through various 
mechanisms: committees of concerned citizens; volunteer youth groups; advice 
and information desks; report cards; and people’s theatre. Considering just one 
of these initiatives, Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs) are local level 
watchdogs and a key pillar in TIB’s social movement against corruption. The 
CCCs are groups of citizens with a high degree of moral and social 
standing/credibility who motivate and mobilise citizens in various activities 
designed to curb corruption and promote good governance. Apart from various 
anti-corruption awareness activities, the focus of the CCCs’ watchdog functions 
is normally on key public services such as education, health, and local 
government. There are 36 CCCs working in 34 districts across all 6 divisions in 
Bangladesh. We consider their activities in these three sectors. Evidence of the 
effectiveness of this grassroots trust building work is drawn from a wider study on 
the impact of their work across Bangladesh which included in-depth case study 
work in schools, hospitals and municipalities (Knox, 2009). 
 
The Health Sector: CCC members and volunteer youth groups have worked 
consistently with hospitals in districts throughout Bangladesh to improve health 
services. They have met with the authorities and identified gaps in their provision. 
They prepared information booklets about the nature and types of health care 
services available which they distributed through satellite advice and information 
desks. In addition, youth groups have organised public theatre shows to access 
illiterate people and raise awareness of their rights to public health provision. As 
a result, there have been some significant developments in health provision such 
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as an improvement in the ticketing system (each patient entering a hospital 
receives a ticket as a form of queuing system). Previously the price of a ticket for 
services in the out-patients department was 4.40 taka, but patients paid 5.00 taka 
due to ‘lack of change’ being available (a form of corruption). Now a fund has 
been created for patients in poverty with the extra 60 paisa received from each 
ticket. Medicine supplies were also very low. Following interventions by the CCC, 
supplies have increased and the list of medicines available is on public display. 
The behaviour of doctors, nurses and ancillary staff towards patients has also 
improved. An ambulance service is available for which patients do not make 
additional payments, patients tests are carried out in the pathology departments 
of the hospitals (as opposed to a private clinic) and toilet facilities have been 
significantly improved. Finally, the issue of cleanliness is a higher priority 
although has still some way to go.  
 
The Education Sector: The CCCs actively engage with primary schools in 
districts throughout Bangladesh, a key improvement being the significant number 
of eligible students now enrolled in schools. Student attendance had not been 
satisfactory and CCCs intervened to address this and other issues. They met 
with school management committees and guardians, organised workshops and 
promotional campaigns along with awards aimed at incentivising attendance. As 
a result, student enrolments have increased and text books are available for free 
distribution to students. The scholarship pass rate has also improved. Teachers, 
the school management committees and guardians are now jointly engaged in 
providing better education for the children in an accountable and transparent 
way. Teacher attendance and performance in their jobs are being closely 
monitored by CCCs. 
 
The Local Government Sector: The work of CCCs in this sector starts with the 
publication of report cards (a review of local government services) which have 
highlighted mismanagement and attracted widespread and critical press 
coverage of local authorities. Following on from this, CCC members have actively 
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engaged with elected bodies to take forward the recommendations outlined in the 
report cards.  In addition, ‘face-the-public’ meetings have been organised 
between senior officials of the Union Parishad/Municipality and local citizens 
during which information leaflets are distributed containing details of service 
available to the public. A number of significant changes are evident in local 
government. These include: a number of roads in a bad state of disrepair have 
been fixed; new tube wells have been set up in some areas and the water is now 
arsenic free. Tax collection has increased and the number of social benefits 
improved for the disabled, the elderly and widows. Extra money had to be paid to 
obtain a trade licence which has been now been stopped. The Union 
Parishad/Municipality budgets have been published for the first time. Local 
citizens were dissatisfied with the opaque process of distributing vulnerable 
group feeding (VGF) cards. The CCCs became involved in this issue resulting an 
increase in the numbers distributed and much greater transparency in the 
process. 
 
External donor-assisted work by Transparency International Bangladesh at the 
micro level therefore provides evidence of grassroots activities working to change 
attitudes and behaviour amongst public service providers. Whether this work can 
survive and grow in the restored democratic system remains to be seen. 
 
Conclusion 
On 29th December 2008 more than 80 million Bangladeshis went to the polls to 
choose a government for the first time since 2001 in what international observers 
judged to be free, fair and credible parliamentary elections. Voting turnout was 
high at over 80% and the most peaceful in decades — a stark contrast to the 
failed elections of 2007, which dissolved into street riots and prompted 
emergency rule. An alliance led by Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League secured a 
landslide victory winning more than two-thirds (231) of the 300 parliamentary 
seats over her arch opponent Bangladesh's last Prime Minister BNP leader 
Khaleda Zia (BNP won 29 seats). Previous experience has shown that losing 
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parties are unwilling to accept the results leading to anarchy and a refusal to 
work the democratic process. The BNP has alleged widespread vote-rigging and 
fraud and lodged a complaint with the Election Commission. One political analyst 
(Rahman, 2008:1) commented on the election results: ‘Hasina has promised to 
bring down food prices and reduce corruption. The ordinary people trust her 
more than Zia, whose rule is fresh in their memory. They wanted to give Hasina 
another chance’ (author’s emphasis). 
Returning to Nye’s (1997) classification of factors which cause changes in trust in 
government is instructive in trying to understand where Bangladesh could go 
from here. Trust, he argued, was causally linked to economic, social-cultural, or 
political factors. Although Bangladesh has achieved significant economic growth 
since independence in 1971, over the last few years its annual economic growth 
has been around 6% while soaring food prices pushed inflation above 10% in the 
fiscal year to June 2008. The new government may benefit in the short run from 
a global slowdown in food and fuel prices but long-term problems exist in the 
agriculture sector, not least because of energy shortages. The key social-cultural 
issues in Bangladesh are the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger and 
vulnerability to disasters/climate changes. Analysts suggest that the economy 
needs to grow by more than 7% each year for Bangladesh to become a middle-
income country by 2020 and by more than 8% to halve poverty by 2015. 
Bangladesh remains hugely at risk from flooding and cyclones/tropical storms.  
A stable government would however be an important factor in establishing trust 
amongst Bangladesh citizens. Confrontational politics and violence have become 
‘a serious threat to democracy and development in Bangladesh’ (Rahaman, 
2007: 101). If the 2008 election results spark the chaos, boycott of parliament, 
lack of political compromise and violence which have characterized the past, 
then building trust in government becomes impossible. The military, having failed 
to break the duopoly of political leaders/parties, will want to see whether the new 
government moves beyond entrenched politics, associated violence, and starts 
to tackle endemic corruption, all impediments to foreign aid and investment in 
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Bangladesh. Without combined progress on these economic, socio-cultural and 
politics factors the prospects of building trust in the new government of 
Bangladesh look bleak. 
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